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Accessing words in speech production: 
Stages, processes and representations*
Willem J.M. Levelt
Max-Planck-lnstitut für Psycholinguistik, Wundtlacin 7, NL 6525 XD Nijmegen, Netherlands
Ich glaube, daß mancher großer Redner, in dem Augenblick, da er den Mund aufmachte, 
noch nicht wußte, was er sagen würde (Heinrich von Kleist, 1809).
Abstract
Levelt, W .J.M ., 1992. Accessing words in speech production: Stages, processes and representations. 
Cognition. 42: 1-22.
This paper introduces a special issue of Cognition on lexical access in speech 
production. Over the last quarter century, the psycholinguistic study of speaking, 
and in particular of accessing words in speech, received a major new impetus from 
the analysis of speech errors, dysfluencies and hesitations, from aphasiology, and 
from new paradigms in reaction time research. The emerging theoretical picture 
partitions the accessing process into two subprocesses, the selection of an appropri­
ate lexical item (a “ lemma") from the mental lexicon, and the phonological 
encoding of that item, that is, the computation of a phonetic program for the item in 
the context of utterance. These two theoretical domains are successively introduced 
by outlining some core issues that have been or still have to be addressed. The final 
section discusses the controversial question whether phonological encoding can 
affect lexical selection. This partitioning is also followed in this special issue as a 
whole. There are, first, four papers on lexical selection, then three papers on 
phonological encoding, and finally one on the interaction between selection and 
phonological encoding.
Issues of lexical access
How do we access words when we speak? This question has not received serious 
scrutiny until relatively recently. But as soon as it was asked, a whole range of 
issues emerged.
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What is the rate of lexical access in normal conversation? Some 120-150 words 
per minute on the average (Maclay & Osgood, 1959), but there are spurts of up to 
double this rate (Deese, 1984).
How manv words do we have to select from? We don't know. There arc
J
reliable ways of estimating the size of our word recognition lexicon (Oldfield, 
1963, estimated the vocabulary size of Oxford undergraduates at about 75 000 
words), but no such tests exist for measuring the active production lexicon. Levelt
(1989) estimated the production lexicon of normal educated adults at about 30 000 
words, but this can easily be out by a factor two. Still, there is no doubt that we 
can access a huge lexical database at high rates, over long stretches of time, and 
without signs of fatigue worth mentioning. This alone characterizes lexical access 
as a cognitive skill par excellence. The skill is further marked by an astonishingly 
low error rate. Garnham, Shillcock, Brown, Mill, and Cutler (1982) found 86 
errors of lexical selection in a spoken text corpus of 200 000 words, and 105 other 
slips of the tongue. That is an error rate of about one per thousand. Butterworth 
(this issue) gives similar data. It is important to stress this low error rate, because 
much of what we know' about lexical access is based on careful analyses of 
naturally occurring speech errors. Reading this literature may create the mislead­
ing impression that felicitous lexical access is a matter of good luck rather than of 
exquisite design.
Are we aware of how we do it? As for most other high-speed skilled 
behaviour, the answer is “ no". We can muse about the meanings of lexical items. 
We can even reject a word that jumps to mind and go for a more appropriate one. 
But we cannot trace the process by which we retrieve a word to start with. 
Introspection is largely useless in the study of lexical access.
This being so, another important issue became how to study the process. Since 
the 1960s and 1970s (and in fact since Meringer & Mayer, 1895), the dominant 
answer has been to study failures of access, slips of the tongue, speech errors 
(Cohen, 1965; Fromkin, 1971, 1973; Garrett, 1975; MacKay, 1970; Nooteboom, 
1967; Shattuck-Hufnagel, 1979; see Cutler, 1982, for a bibliography of the early 
work). And indeed, this work has provided us with the main outlines of the 
processing architecture subserving speech in general, and lexical access in particu­
lar. Another approach has been the analysis of pre-lexical hesitations in sponta­
neous speech (Beattie and Butterworth, 1979; Goldman-Eisler, 1968).
It took longer until issues of lexical access were put to experimental test at any 
scale, or at least so its seems. The initial steps were to elicit speech errors in the 
laboratory, with Baars, Motley, and MacKay (1975) as the pioneers, or to elicit 
tip-of-the-tongue effects (Brown & McNeill, 1966). But in addition, reaction time 
paradigms intruded the study of lexical access, with Oldfield and Wingfield (1965) 
as pioneers and discoverers of the word frequency effect (see also for early 
reaction time studies Glaser & Diingelhoff, 1984; Klapp, 1974; Levelt & Maassen, 
1981; Lupker, 1979). In fact, the reaction time study of lexical access was much
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older, going under headings such as picture naming, colour naming, or even more 
disguised under the name of “ Stroop effect" (cf. La Heij, 1988).1 Glaser (this 
issue) reviews this history.
No less important, finally, is the study of the neuropathology of lexical access. 
Over the last decade or two there has been an increasing integration of the study 
of normal lexical access and its pathology. Garrett (this issue) and Butterworth 
(this issue) review the state of the art, but see also Caramazza and Hillis (1990) 
and Bub and Caplan (in press, chapter 4).
At present, research in lexical access has a pluralistic methodology, ranging 
from the analysis of naturally observed slips of the tongue, via error elicitation, to 
picture naming and picture-word interference studies. In addition, the pathology 
of lexical access in aphasic patients is increasingly contributing to our understand­
ing of the underlying mechanisms.
This brings us to the main issue that emerged. What kind of processing 
mechanism governs the skill of accessing words? If we cannot introspect the 
mechanism, we are at the mercy of our theoretical inventiveness. The first serious
« /
proposal was Morton’s (1969) logogen theory, which is still a significant com­
petitor on the theoretical battleground. The mental lexicon was conceived of as a 
pandemonium, a collection of so-called logogens, each sensitive to its own specific 
information. For speech production (exclusive of reading) a logogen's relevant 
information stems from the “cognitive system", which is semantically active. The 
logogen becomes activated by semantic information relevant to “ its" word. When 
the activation exceeds some threshold value, the logogen fires, and sends the 
phonological code of its word to a so-called “ response buffer", from which an 
overt articulatory response can be initiated.
The logogen theory has (at least) two attractive features. One is that all 
logogens are simultaneously active in “watching" the cognitive system. There is 
parallel processing, which makes the speed of access largely independent of the 
size of the lexicon. The other is that lexical access is a two-step process. The first 
step, the logogen's activation to threshold, is semantic in nature. The second step, 
the logogen’s firing and the preparation of response execution, is phonological in 
nature.
This two-step approach to lexical access is, in one guise or another, common to 
all modern views of lexical access (cf. Butterworth, 1989). There are two 
component processes to lexical access. The first one is lexical selection, retrieving 
the one appropriate word from among thousands of alternatives. The second one 
is phonological encoding, computing the phonetic shape from the selected item's 
phonological code or form specification as it is stored in the mental lexicon 
(Kempen & Huijbers, 1983, called this stored phonological code the lexeme as
l - T ' l
rhe Stroop effect: it is relatively hard to name the colour of a printed word (for instance red) if 
that word is itself the name of a different colour (for instance green), a case of lexical interference or 
competition. See Glaser (this issue) for details.
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phonetic or
articulatory
program
opposed to the lemma). This scheme is presented in Figure 1; it will be used as a 
guideline for the present introductory chapter of this special issue. In the 
following section I will first present some thoughts on lexical selection. This will 
be followed by a section on phonological encoding. The final section will consider 
some aspects of interaction between these two component processes.
This ordering corresponds to the layout of the present special issue. There are, 
first, four contributions on lexical selection. This is followed by three contribu­
tions on phonological encoding. And, finally, there is one paper on the staging 
and potential interaction between lexical selection and phonological encoding.
Lexical selection
A speaker's mustering of words usually serves the performance of some speech 
act. And a speech act is a way of revealing some communicative (and hence 
interactive) intention by means of spoken language. It is important not to ignore 
this larger perspective when discussing matters of lexical selection.
Recent years have seen substantial convergence on the following general 
picture of the initiation of a speech act. In order to reveal some communicative 
intention (e.g., to commit oneself or the interlocutor to some action, to share 
certain experiences with the interlocutor), the speaker will encode a so-called 
“ message" whose expression can be effective in revealing that intention. So, for 
instance, if the speaker intends the addressee to recognize that his intention is to
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let her know that her sister has arrived, an effective message might be the 
declaration that her sister has arrived. But it need not be, dependent on the 
context. It may, for instance, be more effective to declare that an angel or a witch 
(as the matter may be) has arrived. Or the context may make it even more 
effective for the speaker to express the question whether he might just have seen a 
woman entering the door.
The choice of message is a subtle function of the relation between the 
interlocutors, their common ground, the existence of secondary intentions, such 
as to understate or to express irony, and other factors (cf. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Levelt, 1989). And these choices have an immediate impact on lexical 
selection (sister, angel, witch, woman in the above example, all intended to make 
reference to the same person).
It is widely held that a message is a conceptual structure, cast in a propositional 
language of thought. It forms the input to the so-called formulator, whose task it 
is to map the message onto linguistic form. Its final output is a phonetic plan that 
can be executed by the articulatory motor system. The formulator involves two 
component processes: grammatical and phonological encoding (see Figure 1).
Grammatical encoding takes a message as input, retrieves lexical items from 
the mental lexicon, and delivers a surface structure as output. A surface structure 
is a hierarchical organization of syntactic phrases. Its terminal elements are 
lemmas. These are lexical items unspecified for phonological form. They are, 
however, semantically and syntactically specified. Their semantic specification is a 
set of conceptual conditions whose fulfilment in the message is a necessary 
requirement for their retrieval. Their syntactic specification involves category and 
subcategorization information, as well as the way in which grammatical subcate­
gory functions of the lemma are mapped onto the conceptual arguments in its 
semantic description (the thematic role assignments, see especially Jackendoff, 
1990). So, for instance, the lemma swallow has as part of its semantics that some 
theme Y is ingested by some agent X. That is, these conceptual conditions must 
be fulfilled for the appropriate use of that lemma. Syntactically swallow is a 
transitive verb, subcategorizing for two grammatical functions: subject and direct 
object. The canonical thematic mapping for this verb is agent (X ) to subject and 
theme (Y ) to direct object.
Lexical selection drives grammatical encoding. Lemmas are retrieved (acti­
vated, selected) when their semantic conditions are met in the message. In their 
turn, they call (activate, trigger) syntactic procedures that correspond to their 
syntactic specifications. A verb will instigate the construction of a verb phrase, a 
noun the construction of a noun phrase, etc. Grammatical encoding is somewhat 
like solving a set of simultaneous equations, simultaneously realizing the appro­
priate thematic role assignments for all lemmas retrieved. Not quite simultaneous, 
however, because lemmas can become available at different moments in time, 
dependent on the speaker's unfolding of the message. Different orders of lemma
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selection can lead to vastly different syntactic constructions (see Levelt, 1989, for 
an extensive review of grammatical encoding).
But there is a special set of lemmas whose retrieval is not conceptually driven. 
They all belong to the closed class vocabulary. In the woman that arrived the 
relative pronoun that is itself called by the syntactic procedure that constructs 
relative clauses. The retrieval of that is not semantically driven, such as the 
retrieval of woman. Here, in other words, grammatical encoding drives lexical 
selection. Notice, however, that many other closed class items do have some
mr
semantic specification, such as sex or definiteness; these specifications must be 
met at the message level for the item to be selected (except when they are 
syntactically derived by agreement).
I will now formulate some major problems for a theory of lexical selection. 
They are my own selection; others in this special issue will add several more of 
their own.
The hyperonym problem
It was noticed by Levelt (1989) that no existing theory of lexical selection, 
including Morton’s logogen theory and Miller and Johnson-Laird’s (1976) deci­
sion table theory, can account for unique convergence of the conceptual informa-
____  ^
tion onto the one appropriate lexical item. This is due to the hyperonym" 
problem, which was formulated as follows:
When lemma A s  meaning entails lemma B*s meaning, B is a hyperonym of A. 11 A s  conceptual 
conditions are met, then B's arc necessarily also satisfied. Hence, if A is the correct lemma, B will
w
(also) he retrieved.
So, when a speaker intends to express the concept CAT, then all conceptual 
conditions for the retrieval of the lemma animal are also satisfied, because the 
meaning of cat entails the meaning of animal. Why then does the speaker not say 
animal instead of catl
There are two types of approach to this problem. The first one is to maintain 
some degree of compositionality in semantic representations. Bierwisch and 
Schreuder (this issue) argue this to be imperative anyhow. But then one should 
implement what I called a principle of specificity (Levelt, 1989). It should be clear 
that the hyperonym problem derives from an assumption of compositionality: if A 
is a lemma, and B one of its hyperonyms, then the meaning of B is assumed to be 
a constituent part of the meaning of A. As long as one maintains this much 
compositional semantics in the mental lexicon, then any theory of lexical selection
2In Levelt (1989) I introduced the term hypernym (as opposed to hyponym). The correct 
Latin-Greek compound should, however, he hyperonym, as Michael Studdert-Kennedy explained to
me.
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must involve a principle of specificity, which says that of all lemmas whose 
conditions are satisfied by the concept-to-be-expressed the most specific one (the 
most entailing one) should be selected. So, if the intention is to express the 
concept CAT, which satisfies the semantic conditions of the lemmas cat, animal, 
thing, etc., the most specific lemma (cat) should be retrieved. Notice that 
distributed connectionist representations of word meaning arc also subject to the 
hyperonym problem (cf. Roclofs, this issue). I am not aware of any explicit effort 
to implement a specificity principle in such network representations.
The second approach is to give up compositionality altogether, as has been 
proposed by Fodor, Garrett, Walker, and Parkes (1980) and Dik (1987). The 
classical non-compositional implementation of lexical knowledge is by Collins and 
Quillian (1969) and Collins and Loftus (1975). Here concept nodes (such as for 
CAT) are directly linked to word form nodes (such as for /kat/). Intending to 
express the concept CAT means activating the corresponding node, which then 
spreads its activation to the appropriate word form node. Here, the hyperonym 
problem doesn't arise. The node for CAT may spread some of its activation via 
the is-a link to the node for A N IM A L , but the latter node’s activation will 
normally be less than the former node’s, so that the connected word form node 
for animal will receive relatively minor activation. Roelofs (this issue) has 
extended a non-compositional Collins/Quillian/Loftus-type network to incorpo­
rate lemma-level nodes. Then it becomes not only possible to correctly predict 
many of the naming results reviewed by Glaser (this issue), but also some new 
and unexpected ones in the realm of picture-word interference. Garrett (this 
issue) also argues for a lemma level as interface between conceptual and form 
representations, but his arguments stem from the pathology of lexical selection in 
aphasic patients.
It is hard to anticipate which of these two approaches will ultimately be more 
successful. Bierwisch and Schreuder (this issue) at least make us cautious not to 
give up compositionality altogether, and so does Jackendoff (1990). But to the 
extent that compositionality is maintained, the hyperonym problem will keep 
haunting us. Garrett (this issue) analyses hyperonym substitutions in Alzheimer 
patients and featurally defined semantic field effects in aphasics. These deficits 
underline the importance of the compositionality issue.
The dissection problem
How do we dissect an idea to be expressed into lexical concepts, that is, into 
conceptual “ chunks" that map neatly onto lemmas? What makes a speaker say 
John is Mary's father rather than John is Mary's male parent? There are certainly 
thinkable contexts in which the latter is the more appropriate expression. Is it the 
same idea here that is dissected into one or into two lexical concepts? Or is there
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no full synonymy here between father and male parent, following Eve Clark’s 
(1987, 1990) “ principle of contrast” ? Clearly, the dissection problem is related to 
the issue of compositionality as Bierwisch and Schreuder (this issue) explicate. If 
each lemma has a unique relation to a single concept, the dissection problem will 
not arise (cf. Roelofs, this issue). The speaker will either have an active FA T H ER  
node, or two active nodes M A L E  and PARENT. This “solution” , however, shifts 
the weight of the problem to the speaker's conceptual intentions. Is this the right 
level of analysis? Our preference for using so-called “ basic level" terms (Glaser, 
this issue; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boycs-Braem, 1976; Seymour, 1979) 
indicates that we have a preference for chopping up our message in such a way 
that it can be mapped onto this basic level vocabulary. But it may be intractable 
what is the chicken and the egg here. We may, after all, prefer to think in “ basic 
level concepts” , whether or not we intend to express them in language.
The imitation problem
There is both conversational (Schenkein, 1980; Harley, 1984) and experimental 
(Levelt & Kelter, 1982) evidence that speakers tend to have some preference for 
words that have recently been used by the interlocutor or by themselves. This 
tendency cannot be fully explained by the interlocutors sharing the same topic of 
discourse (if the topic is for instance the American president, it is likely - anno 
1991 - that the partners in speech will tend to use the word Bush a lot). The 
experimental evidence shows that the preference for re-using words even extends 
to words that are semantically non-discriminative. There is, in addition, a strong 
recency effect (Levelt & Kelter, 1982), which makes it likely that the effect is 
caused by a temporary extra activation of the relevant lemma, due to the 
speaker’s hearing or using the word. Bock and Loebell (1990) found that, 
similarly, syntactic constructions can be induced without there being any con­
ceptual-level grounds for it. This syntactic induction may, in turn, induce the 
selection of particular closed class items (such as by when a passive is induced). 
This might explain some of the Levelt and Kelter results, which concerned 
closed-class items. More generally, the fluency of formulating seems to be served 
by re-using recently activated words. In short, as long as a theory of lexical 
selection only acknowledges semantic or syntactic reasons for selecting words, 
these imitation phenomena cannot be explained.
The problem of collocations
This problem was recently formulated by Ward (1988, 1991). The selection of one 
word can depend on the selection of another word, without there being conceptu­
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al reasons for this. Ward gives the example of strong air currents versus high 
winds. Conceptually, the modification is identical in the two cases, but different 
words (strong, high) have to be selected in dependence on the head that is 
modified. Another example is to fall into disuse versus to sink into oblivion. In 
this context fall and sink are virtually synonymous, but cannot be exchanged. 
Probably, the lemmas for disuse and oblivion carry phrasal information involving 
fall and sink respectively.
The collocation problem is not well separable from what one might call the 
idiom problem. Certain concepts arc well expressed by idiomatic phrases, such as 
red tape. That this is a phrase, not a compound, appears from its iambic stress 
pattern. It differs from the trochaic stress pattern of a compound like hot dog. But 
an idiomatic phrase is peculiar as a phrase for two reasons. First, its meaning is 
opaque, not compositional (red tape has very little to do with either tape or red), 
and second it allows for only restricted syntactic variations (*my tape is even 
redder than yours, ' two red tapes, etc.). It is not entirely clear how the speaker’s 
production of idioms should be modelled. Probably, an idiom is a special kind of 
lexical entry, specified for the (opaque) meaning. If that semantic condition is met 
by the message, the idiom is retrieved, just as for any other content word. It calls 
the constituent lemmas (like red and tape) and imposes its degraded or limited 
syntax on the further process of grammatical encoding, in ways that are still to be 
explored.
These are some problems of lexical selection to be solved, and more will be added 
in the final section of this chapter and in the paper by Dell and O'Seaghdha (this 
issue), where the potential influence of phonological encoding on lexical selection 
is discussed. The main problem, however, is to develop theoretical frameworks in 
which these problems can be addressed. Such frameworks will be at issue in the 
following papers by Bierwisch and Schreuder, Glaser, Roelofs, Garrett, and Dell 
and O'Seaghdha.
Phonological encoding
The second phase of lexical access in speech production is phonological encoding. 
Eventually, the selected lexical item must be given phonetic shape. A word's 
phonetic form is not a ready-made template that can be retrieved as a whole. 
Speech error research has made it abundantly clear that a word’s ultimate shape is 
to be constructed time and again. An error such as peel like flaying (instead of the 
intended feel like playing) reveals that a word's “skeleton" can (at least to some 
extent) be specified independently from the segments that have to fill it. In the 
process of constructing feel the speaker apparently missed the segmental informa­
tion /!'/. But the fact that the speaker didn't say eel then, but peel makes it likely
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that there was already an active word skeleton requiring an onset consonant. The 
onset slot was then erroneously filled by the already available segment /p/. 
Though the segment / p / had been used now, the speaker did not proceed to say 
laying instead of playing. Rather, the word flaying was constructed. Presumably 
also here the word's skeleton was already available; its first consonantal slot was 
then HI led by the now available / f /, thus creating a second error. Probably the 
most fundamental insight from modern speech error research is that a word's 
skeleton or frame and its segmental content are independently generated. Shat- 
tuck-Hufnagel's (1979) slot-and-filler theory was the first formal rendering of this 
insight (see Meyer, this issue, for a review).
Far less attention has been paid in the literature to the question why this should 
be so. In fact, the frame-filling notion seems quite paradoxical. Why would a 
speaker go to the trouble of first generating an empty skeleton for the word, and 
then filling it with segments? In some way or another both must proceed from a 
stored phonological representation, the word's phonological code in the lexicon. 
Isn’t it wasteful of processing resources to pull these apart first, and then to 
combine them again (on the risk of creating a slip)? As Meyer (this issue) shows, 
this question has been essentially ignored in the standard accounts of phonological 
encoding.
The answer must probably be sought in the generation of connected speech (cf. 
Levelt, 1989). Talking is mapping discrete linguistic representations onto pro­
nounceable and continuous phonetic programs. The construction of frames serves 
the purpose of creating a pronounceable metrical pattern for the utterance as a 
whole. And that metrical pattern is not just a concatenation of individual word 
frames. It is rather more the exception than the rule that a word’s stored skeleton 
will eventually turn up as a frame to be filled. The speaker produces frames for 
phonological words (co). These are metrical units, not lexical units. A phonologi­
cal word is the domain of syllabification (see below) and of word stress assign­
ment. It is never smaller than a morpheme, but it can be larger. In English (but 
not in all other languages) a phonological word is composed of a head word with 
its affixes and clitics; there may even be two or more head words involved (as in 
certain compounds).3 In Black Bear gave ii him , there are two phonological words: 
Black Bear and gavitim. The former one is a compound with its characteristic 
trochaic word stress, and corresponds to a single (compound) item in the mental 
lexicon. The latter one derives from a head word (gave) and two dependent words 
(it and him) that are cliticized to the head word.
The domain of syllabification in speech production is precisely the phonological
Nespor and Vogel (1986) distinguish between a phonological word and a clitic group. The 
phonological word is the domain of syllabification. The clitic group allows for more limited syllabic 
interactions only. However, Lahiri, Jongman, and Sereno ( 1990) argue that the clitic group notion 
might he superfluous, at least for the phonology of Dutch. I will follow the latter authors in assuming 
that cliticization results in the creation of a phonological word.
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word. So, for instance, gavitim is syllabified as ga-vi-tim (here the /v/ may be 
ambisyllabic), which violates all lexical boundaries. This shows that at the level of 
frames-to-be-filled lexical boundaries have lost their significance. It is therefore 
not generally the case that phonological encoding consists of filling pre-existing 
lexical skeletons. Rather, new phonological word frames are constructed, depen­
dent on the context of utterance. It is these newly constructed frames that have to 
be filled with segmental materials. Hence, there is no paradox.
There are four major questions to be answered by a theory of phonological 
encoding. They are:
Question 1: how are a word's segments made available and to what detail are they
specified in the lexicon?
Question 2: how are phonological frames constructed?
Question 3: how are segments associated with slots in the frame?
Question 4: how is a filled frame translated into a phonetic or articulatory
program?
O f these, Questions 1 and 3 have received abundant attention. Questions 2 and 4, 
however, have been largely disregarded.
Let us first consider Question 1, the spelling out of a word’s phonological 
segments. Here, the most important addition on last decade's theoretical scene 
has been the connectionist modelling of segmental activation and selection (Dell, 
1985, 1986; MacKay, 1987; Stemberger, 1985; and others). What these accounts 
have in common is the notion of the lexicon as a multilayer network of nodes, 
connected by arcs. The nodes can be in different states of activation, and they can 
spread their activation over (weighted) arcs to connected nodes. As far as 
phonological encoding is concerned, the relevant part of the network consists of a 
layer of lexical nodes at the “ top" level, a layer of phonological feature nodes at 
the bottom level, and a number of layers mediating between these two. In these 
models, the phonological segments, or rather their features, are made available 
through activation spreading from the lexical nodes. More details can be found in 
Dell and O'Seaghdha (this issue).
But the theories differ substantially in detail. They differ in the kinds and 
numbers of mediating layers (morpheme, syllable, cluster, segment and other 
layers), in the directionality of activation spreading (one-way or two-way), in the 
presence or absence of inhibitory connections between same-level nodes, in the 
amount of extraneous (structurally determined) activation impinging on the 
network, in the amount of over- or underspecification of segmental information in 
the network, and in their degree of explicit computer modelling and quantifica­
tion. In short, theorizing is very much in flux here, and it seems to me that an 
exclusive reliance on speech error data will not suffice to sort out the theoretical 
differences (see Meyer, this issue, for more details).
More in particular, there is an increasing need for reaction time studies of
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phonological encoding. Connectionist models, if sufficiently explicit, may lend 
themselves well to experimental test by reaction time paradigms, as the work by 
Dell (1986, 1988), Meyer (1990, 1991), Schriefers, Meyer, and Levelt (1990), and 
Levelt et al. (1991a) has shown (see also below). In addition, as Butterworth (this 
issue) argues, the pathology of phonological encoding may tell us something 
about the underlying, stored representations and their spell-out mechanisms in 
lexical access. Segments may well be underspccificd in our word form lexicon, as 
Stemberger (1983) already suggested. And this is in accordance with recent 
phonological theory (cf. Archangeli, 1988). How a complete phonetic specifica­
tion arises from such underspccificd segments is part of our Question 4, to which 
we will return below.
Turning now to Question 2, the connected speech perspective introduced 
above requires one to ask: how does a speaker generate the frame of a 
phonological word? Levelt (1989) assumes the existence of a prosody generator 
that takes as input the phrasal syntactic information and the metrical spell-out of 
words, and produces as output an organization of metrical units (in particular 
phonological words and phonological phrases).
For each incoming metrical pattern, the prosody generator will decide whether 
the pattern is to stay alone as a phonological word, or whether it is to be attached 
to the previous, or maybe a following head element. Here the syntactic informa­
tion accessible to the prosody generator is crucial. For instance, pronouns can be 
attached to the main verb of the same clause, but nouns cannot. In leave me 
alone, leave and me can compose a phonological word, but in leave Maureen 
alone, leave and Maureen cannot (cf. Nespor &. Vogel, 1986). It is also impossible 
to form phonological words across phonological phrase boundaries. For instance, 
I wanna go is possible, but the sentence What I want, to be honest, is to go cannot 
be uttered as ' What I wanna be honest, is to go. There is a phonological phrase 
boundary between want and to here.
« /
For the construction of phonological words, the prosody generator must 
further have access to the metrical information that is stored with the words in the 
mental lexicon. A lexeme's metrical information is “ spelled out" at an early stage 
in phonological encoding, according to Levelt (1989). So, for instance, a speaker 
in the “ tip-of-the-tongue" state often knows a word's number of syllables and 
stress pattern without having access to most or all of the segmental information. 
Apart from being non-segmental (or “ non-melodic" as the unhappy phonological 
term goes), the precise character of the metrical spell-out is as yet undecided.
Following Hayes (1989), the word’s metrical spell-out could, among other 
things, contain its <x,/i pattern, that is, its syllable/mora structure. This amounts 
to saying that the metrical spell-out contains at least the following two pieces of 
information:
(1) the word's number of syllables (not the syllables themselves);
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(2) the weight of the subsequent syllables (strong/weak - a two-morae syllable is 
strong, a one-mora syllable is weak).
In addition, the metrical spell-out may contain:
(3) the word’s foot structure or stress pattern (this is only necessary in languages 
where a word’s stress pattern is not fully determined by the weights of its 
syllables).
The latter is in phenomenological agreement with the just mentioned tip-of-the- 
tongue state of metrical information.
To represent the above three pieces of information, one minimally needs a 
string of rr's (syllable nodes) each specified for weight (i.e., number of morac), 
and one for the word’s main stress.
Hence, something like
[a cr'\
M M M
for the word neglect. The word has two syllables, the last of which is heavy and 
stressed. It is notationally convenient to have word boundary symbols ( “ [” and 
“ ]” ). This makes it easier to discuss the formation of phonological words, to 
which we turn now.
If the word neglect in the utterance is part of the verb phrase neglect it (as in / 
neglect it), the prosody generator can construct the phonological word neglectit. 
The first step here is to concatenate the metrical frames of the two constituting 
lexical items, which can be diagrammed as follows:
neglect it neglectit
[a  cr'\ [cr] [cr cr' cr]
t o
+
¡JL /JL fi fJL fJL fJL /JL
Here the subscript co indicates that neglectit is a phonological word frame.
The next step is to fill this frame with the spelled-out segmental information 
stemming from the two matrix lexical items (neglect and it) and to syllabify the 
resulting phonological word.
This brings us to Question 3: how are the segments (or “planning units” ) 
associated with positions in the phonological word frames? The reader is again 
referred to Meyer’s review in the present issue. There is, in addition, Shattuck- 
Hufnagel’s paper, which argues for the special status of the word-initial slot in this 
process of association. That slot is the most vulnerable position in the process of 
filler-to-slot association, testifying to the reality of word frames in phonological
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encoding. Nothing in the latter paper is in disagreement with the notion intro­
duced here that these word frames are in fact phonological word frames. As we 
will shortly see, the vulnerability of the word-initial segment may in part be due to 
the restrictions these phonological word frames impose on their filler segments. In 
his paper for the present issue, Butterworth discusses various disorders of 
assembling and syllabifying words in phonemic paraphasias.
Here I will only exemplify the filling process and the concurrent syllabification 
by returning to the phonological word neglectii, whose frame was presented 
above:
ne glee tit
(t a' a 1
J u)
Experimental reaction time evidence (Meyer & Schriefers, 1991) shows that the 
process of filler-to-slot association is a rather strictly “ left-to-right" one. What I 
propose now is that syllabification takes place “on the fly" as this left-to-right 
association of segments to metrical positions is taking place. For this to occur, the 
spelled-out segments from the matrix items are assumed to be ordered - or more 
precisely, to become available in the right order (speech errors show that this 
ordering can be occasionally disrupted). So, for the present phonological word, 
the planning units / n/, / i /, /g/, /l/, /e/, /k/, / 1/, /I/, /1/ (or their less specified 
equivalents) are spelled out in this order. They are then one by one associated to 
the frame, from “ left to right" and following a set of association rules that are - in 
part - language specific. A general convention here is that attachment to î j ,  the 
syllable node, can only occur on the left-hand side of a syllable, that is, to the left 
of any unfilled morae of that syllable.
Among the rules for English are:
( t )  A vowel only associates to /i.
(2) The default association of a consonant is to tr. A consonant associates to /i if 
and only if any of the following conditions holds:
(a) the next element is lower in sonority;
(b) there is no cr to associate to;
(c) associating to <x would leave a ^  without associated element.
Rule (1) says that a vowel is always involved in a syllable's weight. Or in
JOn a traditional account, this means that a consonant attaches by default to the onset of a 
syllable. In Hayes' (1989) theory, which 1 follow here at least notationally, there are no onsets and 
rhymes. Still, essentially the same process of association can be notated in an onset/rhyme representa­
tion of the syllable. In that case syllable weight is not represented by the number of morae, but by the 
branchintiness of the rhyme.
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traditional rhyme terminology: a vowel is always part of a syllable's rhyme. The 
default association of rule (2) is what is traditionally known as “ maximization of 
onset" (cf., for instance, Selkirk, 19S4). Consonants between two vowels in a 
word (i.e., between two syllabic nuclei) are as much as possible associated with 
the second syllable (i.e., maximizing the second syllable's onset). Condition (a) of 
rule (2) is traditionally known as the sonority gradient. In a syllable's onset the 
sonority of segments increases (or at least does not decrease) towards the nucleus. 
After the nucleus, sonority decreases again (or at least doesn't increase). This 
makes, for example, /slorp/ a possible syllable but /Isopr/ an impossible one. 
Checking for condition (a) requires a one-element look-ahead in the association 
process. Condition (b) takes care of “ left-over" consonants at the end of a word; 
they have no new syllable to go to, and are added to the last /i (traditionally: to 
the rhyme of the final syllable). Condition (c) takes care that, where necessary, a
m m  * X  f  J
consonant will carry the weight of a syllable. A mora should not stay unfilled 
because that would change a syllable's weight.
These rules suffice to exemplify the association process and syllabification of 
the phonological word neglectit. The first spcllcd-out element is / n /. Since neither 
of the conditions (a) through (e) of (2) hold, / n / is associated to the first cron the 
left in the frame. The next element is / i /. It is a vowel, and must be associated to 
/jl according to rule (1). The next element /g/ is a consonant. It will, by default, 
be attached to cr (condition (2a), for instance, doesn't apply, because /l/ is higher 
in sonority than /g/). Since right attachment to the first cr is excluded by generalJ  C? '  O  J
convention, /g/ attaches to the next <x. The next consonant, /l/, also attaches to 
(the same) cr, following the default of rule (2). The vowel /e /  then attaches to / j l  
according to rule (1). The next element, /k/, must associate to fi for two reasons. 
First, attaching it to the next rr would leave the second fi of the current syllable 
without associate (condition (2c)). Second, the following element ( /1/) is lower in 
sonority (condition (2a)). The / 1/, however, will by default be attached to the 
following cr, thus creating a syllable boundary between / k / and /1/. (The fact that 
/ 1/ is syllable initial and preceding a vowel has as an important phonetic 
consequence that it will be aspirated.) The vowel / I/ attaches to the linal ¡jl, and 
the last element / 1/ attaches to the same /jl, following condition (b) of rule (2). 
The end result (with syllables indicated) is:
M M
k
Using the same set of rules, the syllabification of the phonological word regret it 
will be re-gret-it. The first / 1/ is not syllable initial here, because that would leave
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one p of the second syllable without dependent, violating condition (2c). As a 
consequence, this /1/, not being syllable initial, will not be aspirated.
This picture of the association process differs from the standard accounts 
(reviewed in Meyer’s paper) in that the one-slot-one-segment idea is given up. 
The frame doesn’t completely specify the number of slots to be filled. For 
instance, the number of segments to be associated with a  is not specified 
beforehand, it depends on the ordered string of spelled-out segments and on the 
fulfilment of conditions in rule (2) whether a syllable's onset will be a single 
segment or a cluster.
Another difference is that we are dealing now with phonological words, not 
lexical words. On the traditional account, the error peel like flaying (for feel like 
playing) involves exchanging consonants across an intermediate word. But the 
speaker who produced this error was probably planning just two phonological 
words here, [feelike]tit and [playing]ta. On the phonological word account, 
Shattuck-HufnageTs finding (this issue) that word onsets are more vulnerable to 
error than other syllable onsets now predicts that the mentioned error is a more 
likely one than, for instance, leel fike playing. The /l/ in like is internal to the 
phonological word; it is not word initial and hence less vulnerable.
The sketched account, moreover, provides us with one possible reason for 
Shattuck-Hufnagel's finding (1987, this issue) that word-final consonants are less 
vulnerable to error in phrases than in lists. For instance, the word-final conson­
ants in a tongue-twister like parade fad foot parole are relatively more vulnerable 
than in a tongue-twister like the parade is a fad and the foot has parole. This may 
be due to the formation of phonological words in the phrasal context. In the 
example, [paradis]to and [ footas]ul are potential phonological words. When they 
are, the critical consonants are no longer word final, as they are in the list. 
However, under the phrasal condition nothing changes for the word-internal 
consonants, such as / r/ in parade. They keep being word internal. And indeed, as 
Shattuck-Hufnagel (this issue) shows, the relative vulnerability of these word- 
internal consonants is not affected by phrasal context.
The present account of the association process in connected speech is a highly 
preliminary one. It needs further elaboration, but is presented here to highlight 
the notion that syllabification is a late process in phonological encoding, that it is 
a consequence of the left-to-right association of segments to a metrical frame, and 
that the domain of syllabification is the phonological word.
Let us now turn to the fourth issue formulated above: how is a filled frame 
translated into a phonetic or articulatory program? The slot-and-filler theory has 
nothing to say about this problem. It is a theory about how phonemic segments 
find their ultimate positions in a metrical frame. It does not specify the allophonic 
phonetic shapes of segments within the word or syllable. Similarly, none of the 
connectionist theories address this issue. On first view, they do seem to take a 
step in the right direction by adding a level of feature nodes at the bottom of the
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network. But these feature nodes represent discrete phonological features, not 
scaled phonetic ones. In particular, there is no mechanism for making feature 
values dependent on a segment’s context in the syllable or word.
Here, I only want to signal this hiatus in theory construction. In Levelt (1989) I 
adopted an important suggestion by Crompton (1982), which in my view indicates 
one way in which this hiatus can be filled. Crompton proposed that the syllables 
composed in phonological encoding function as addresses for stored phonetic 
syllable templates. One can conceive of these syllable templates as motor 
instructions for complex articulatory gestures. Following Browman and Goldstein
(1990) one would call these “gestural scores", that is, specifications of articulatory 
tasks to be performed in pronouncing the syllables. I added that these syllable 
scores still have a few free parameters to be fixed, such as stress, rate and pitch 
parameters. Still, they are genuine phonetic, not phonological representations. 
The idea that we have a “ phonetic syllabary" is certainly not obvious. It is quite 
an attractive idea for a language such as Chinese, which has no more than about 
400 different syllables. But what about English or Dutch, which have somewhere 
between 6500 and 7000 different syllables? Would they all be stored in the 
speaker’s head as phonetic templates or scores? One straightforward prediction 
from the theory is a frequency effect. It should take more time to retrieve a 
low-frequency syllable template than a high-frequency template. In our labora­
tory, Linda Wheeldon and I (in preparation) could confirm that prediction for 
Dutch. Naming latencies (not reading latencies) were slower for words consisting 
of low-frequent syllables than for words consisting of high-frequent syllables. This 
effect was completely independent of the word frequency effect, but is (as could 
be expected) related to the phonetic complexity of the syllables.
But even if the notion of an independent phonetic syllabary receives further 
experimental support, it cannot be the whole story. The syllable is not the only 
context of phonetic variation; there are cross-syllable and cross-word phonetic 
effects that are still to be explained.
The interaction between lexical selection and phonological encoding
Lexical selection and phonological encoding are wildly different processes. Lexi­
cal selection is semantically (or syntactically) driven search for an appropriate 
item in a hu^e lexical store. Phonological encoding is the creation of an 
executable phonetic program for a single item in context. On first view, it would 
not seem like a great feat of psychological engineering if these two kinds of 
process were to interact with one another. It would add unnecessary error 
proneness to both aspects of the accessing system. Still, in an important paper, 
Dell and Reich (1981) presented statistical evidence from speech errors showing 
that errors of selection and errors of phonological encoding were not entirely
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independent. Moreover, there is a lexical bias effect (already reported by Baars, 
Motley, & MacKav, 1975), which means that trouble in phonological encoding 
tends to create real words more often than should be expected by chance. These 
findings have been replicated by Stemberger (1983), Harley (1984), Dell (1986), 
Martin, Weisber« and Saffran (1989) and form a challenge to the above modular 
view of the accessing process.
The observed interactions between lexical selection and phonological encoding 
found a natural theoretical explanation in connectionist models of lexical access. 
In particular, models that allowed for both forward and backward spreading of 
activation between levels of representation (Stemberger, 1985; Dell, 1986) could 
account for the statistical speech error evidence.
But Levelt et al. (1991a) argued that models of that kind also have specific 
implications for the time course of lexical access- implications that can be tested 
by appropriate reaction time experiments. Specifically, all connectionist models 
would predict that coactivated semantic alternatives to the target item (e.g., goal 
when the target item is sheep) would, at some moment during lexical access, 
undergo some degree of phonological activation. In addition, the models that 
allow for backward spreading of activation should predict that there is a late 
rebound of semantic activation following phonological activation. However, 
neither of these predictions could be experimentally substantiated.
The authors then argued for two directions in further research. The first one 
would be a careful exercise in the parametrization of connectionist models. Or, 
would it be possible to have just enough interactiveness between levels in the 
network to account for the above-mentioned statistical effects, but still so little 
that no measurable phonological coactivation of semantic alternatives and no 
measurable semantic rebound would occur? In his contribution to the present 
issue, Dell argues that appropriate parameters can indeed be found. For a full 
appreciation of this claim, the reader is referred to an ongoing discussion: Dell 
and O'Seaghdha (1991) and Levelt et al. (1991b). One issue raised there is what 
functional sense feedback could have in a lexical production network (it surely 
cannot be merely to cause a specific type of speech error). Dell (1988) suggested 
that a deep reason for feedback could be that the same lexical network is also used 
for lexical access in comprehension, which obviously would involve activation 
spreading in the reverse direction. For this double use of the same network we pay 
by occasionally making specific kinds of speech errors. This is a challenging 
suggestion: are the accessing mechanisms of production and comprehension 
making use of the same unified lexical network, or are there independent input 
and output networks? The latter view would find support if a double dissociation 
could be found in the pathology of lexical access. Allport (1984) explicitly raised 
this issue, but could not find convincing evidence of this kind. On the other hand, 
Howard and Franklin's (1988) patient MK seems to provide one half of this 
double dissociation.
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A second direction, proposed by Garrett (personal communication), is to look 
more carefully into the situations in which mixed errors arise. They may be 
“environmentals", that is, intrusions of words that happen to be in the speaker's 
span of attention. In the Martin et al. (1989) study, for instance, the response set 
in the experiments contained a highly apparent subset of items that were not only 
semantically related to one another, but also phonologically. No surprise that the 
subjects tended to make confusions among these items. This probably has nothing 
to do with the fact that these items were phonologically related; any other marked 
relation among the items would have produced the same result. If Garrett is right, 
the occurrence of mixed errors may, after all, not exceed chance level if 
“ environmentals" are excluded.
The third direction would be to give renewed attention to the possibility that 
the observed interactions are due to post-lexical processes. The speaker monitors 
his lexical productions to some extent (see also Butterworth, this issue), and can 
intercept imminent errors before they are overtly produced. This might account 
for some of the above statistical findings on speech errors. So, for instance, if a 
phonological error creates a non-word, it is more likely to be intercepted than 
when it creates a word; a word is well formed, a non-word is not. This “editor" 
theory was originally proposed by Baars et al. (1975), and elaborated in several 
subsequent publications. See Levelt (1989, chapter 12) for a review, and for a 
comparison between editor theories and connectionist accounts of the phenomena 
under discussion. My conclusion there was that it will not be easy to distinguish 
these two approaches experimentally. And indeed, the game is still as open as it 
was at the time. Only new, sophisticated research on the speaker's self-monitoring 
can end this deadlock.
Let me, finally, add one more issue to the already disquieting list of problems 
reviewed in this introductory paper. What we have just discussed with respect to 
phonological encoding and lexical selection, namely whether there is a real 
feedback there, can also be considered at the next higher level. Is our selection of 
concepts-to-be-expressed to any extent dependent on lexical selection? There is 
not only the general Whorfian problem looming on the horizon here (cf. 
Schlesinger, 1990, for an excellent review); but there is also a more specific 
processing issue involved. The aphorism from Kleist (1809) heading this paper 
suggests that there can be spontaneous activity in a speaker's formulator, 
generating words or phrases that present themselves to the speaker as potential 
issues to talk about.^ One important question then is, What is the “ routing" of 
that feedback? Is an active lemma directly feeding back to the conceptual level? 
The present evidence for such a direct link is minimal (cf., Levelt, 1989, pp. 275 
ff.). Or is it feeding back via internal speech, i.e., does it involve (internal)
'Daniel Dennett (personal communication) alerted me to the idea of spontaneous activity in the 
formulator feeding back to the conceptual level (see also Dennett, 1991).
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phonological encoding of the activated word? The latter view has some phe­
nomenological face value. But as I said earlier, phenomenology is not of much 
help in dissecting the process of lexical access.
References
Allport, D .A . (1984). Spcech production and comprehension: One lexicon or two? In W. Prinz & A.F. 
Sanders (Eds.), Cognition and motor processes (pp. 209-228). Berlin: Springer.
Archangeli, D. (1988). Aspects of underspecification theory. Phonology, 5, 183-207.
Baars, B.J., Motley, M.T., & MacKay, D. (1975). Output editing for lexical status from artificially 
elicited slips of the tongue. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14, 382-391.
Beattie, G ., & Butterworth, B. (1979). Contextual probability and word frequency as determinants of 
pauses in spontaneous speech. Language and Speech, 22, 201-211.
Bock, J .K ., & Loebell, H. (1990). Framing sentences. Cognition, 35, 1-40.
Brownian, C.P., & Goldstein, L. (1990). Gestural specification using dynamically-defined articulatory 
structures. Haskins Laboratories Status Report on Speech Research. SR-103/104, 95-110.
Brown, R ., & McNeill, D. (1966). The “ tip of the tongue" phenomenon. Journal of Verbal Learning 
and Verbal Behavior, 5. 325-337.
Bub, D ., & Caplan, D. (in press). Aphasiology for speech-language pathologists.
Butterworth, B. (1989). Lexical access in speech production. In W. Marslen-Wilson (Ed.), Lexical 
representation and process (pp. 108-135). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Caramazza, A ., & Hillis (1990). Where do semantic errors come from? Cortex, 26, 95-122.
Clark, E.V. (1987). The principle of contrast: A constraint on language acquisition. In B. MacWhinney 
(Ed.), Mechanisms of language acquisition (pp. 1-33). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Clark, E. (1990). On the pragmatics of contrast. Journal of Child Language, /7, 417—131.
Clark. H ., & Wilkes-Gibbs. D.L. (1986). Referring as a collaborative process. Cognition, 22, 1-39.
Cohen, A. (1965). Versprekingen als verklappers bij het proces van spreken en verstaan. Forum der 
Letteren, 6, 175-186.
Collins, A .M ., & Loftus. E.F. (1975). A sprcading-activation theory of semantic processing. Psycho­
logical Review, 82, 407-428.
Collins, A .M ., & Ouillian, M .R . (1969). Retrieval time from semantic memory. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 8, 240-247.
Crompton, A. (1982). Syllables and segments in speech production. In A. Cutler (Ed.), Slips of the 
tongue and language production. Berlin: Mouton.
Cutler, A. (1982). Speech errors: A classified bibliography. Bloomington: Indiana Linguistics Club.
Deese, J. (1984). Thought into speech: The psychology of a language. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall.
Dell, G.S. (1985). Positive feedback in hierarchical connectionist models: Applications to language 
production. Cognitive Science, 9, 3-23.
Dell, G.S. (1986). A spreading activation theory of retrieval in sentence production. Psychological 
Review, 93, 283-321.
Dell, G.S. (1988). The retrieval of phonological forms in production: Tests of predictions from a 
connectionist model. Journal of memory and language, 27, 124-142.
Dell. G ., & O ’Seaghdha (1991). Mediated and convergent lexical priming in language production: A 
comment on Levelt et al. (1991). Psychological Review, 98, 604-614.
Dell, G .S ., &. Reich, P.A. (1981). Stages in sentence production: An analysis of speech error data. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 611-629.
Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Dik, S.C. (1987). Linguistically motivated knowledge representation. In M. Nagao (Ed.), Language 
and artificial intelligence (pp. 145-170). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Press.
Accessing words in speech production 21
Fodor, J .A .,  Garrett, M .F., Walker, E.C.T., & Parkes, C .H . (1980). Against definitions. Cognition, S, 
263-367.
Fromkin, V.A. (1971). The non-anomalous nature of anomalous utterances. Language, 47, 27-52. 
(Reprinted in: Fromkin, V.A. (Ed.) (1973). Speech errors as linguistic evidence. The Hague: 
Mouton.)
Fromkin, V.A. (Ed.) (1973). Speech errors as linguistic evidence. The Hague: Mouton.
Garnham, A ., Shillcock, R.S., Brown, G .D .A . ,  Mill, A . I .D., & Cutler, A. (1982). Slips of the tongue 
in the London-Lund corpus of spontaneous conversations. In A. Cutler (Ed.), Slips of the 
tongue and language production (pp. 251-263). Berlin: Mouton.
Garrett, M.F. (1975). The analysis of sentence production. In G. Bower (Ed.), Psychology of learning 
and motivation (Vol. 9, pp. 133-175). New York: Academic Press.
Glaser. W .R ., & Düngelhoff, F.J. (1984). The time course of picture-word interference. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 10, 640-654.
Goldman-Eisler, F. (1968). Psycholinguistics: Experiments in spontaneous speech. New York: Academ­
ic Press.
Harley, T .A . (1984). A critique of top-down independent levels of speech production: Evidence from 
non-plan-internal speech errors. Cognitive Science, 8, 191-219.
Haves, B. (1989). Compensatory lengthening in moraic phonology. Linguistic Inquiry, 20, 253-306.
Howard, D., & Franklin, S. (1988). Missing the meaning? A cognitive neuropsychological study of the 
processing of words by an aphasic patient. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jackendoff, R. (1990). Semantic structures. Cambridge, MA: M IT Press.
Kempen. G ., & Huijbers, P. (1983). The lexicalization process in sentence production and naming: 
Indirect election of words. Cognition, 14, 185-209.
Klapp, S.T. (1974). Syllable-dependent pronunciation latencies in number naming, a replication. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102, 1138-1140.
• •
Kleist. H. von (1809). Uber die allmähliche Verfertigung der Gedanken beim Reden. In H. von Kleist, 
Sämtliche Werke und Briefe (pp. 320-327). München: Carl Hanscr Verlag.
Lahiri, A ., Jongman, A ., & Sereno, .1. (1990). The pronominal clitic [dor| in Dutch: A theoretical and 
experimental approach. Yearbook of Phonology, 3, 1-13.
La Heij, W. (1988). Components of Stroop-like interference in picture naming. Memory and 
Cognition, 16, 400—110.
Levelt, W .J.M . (1989). Speaking: Prom intention to articulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levelt. W .J .M ., & Kelter, S. (1982). Surface form and memory in question answering. Cognitive 
Psychology, 14, 78-106.
Levelt, W .J.M ., & Maassen, B. (1981). Lexical search and order of mention in sentence production. In 
W. Klein & W .J.M . Levelt (Eds.), Crossing the boundaries in linguistics: Studies presented to 
Manfred Bierwisch (pp. 221-252). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Levelt, W .J.M ., Schriefers, H., Vorberg, D., Meyer, A .S., Pechmann, T., & Havinga, J. (1991a). The 
time course of lexical access in speech production: A study of naming. Psychological Review, 98, 
122-142.
Levelt, W .J.M ., Schriefers, H., Vorberg, D., Meyer, A .S., Pechmann. T.. & Havinga, J. (1991b). 
Normal and deviant lexical processing: A reply to Dell and O'Seaghdha. Psychological Review,
98, 615-618.
Lupker, S.J. (1979). The semantic nature of competition in the picture-word interference task. 
Canadian Journal of Psychology, 36, 485—195.
MacKay, D. (1970). Spoonerisms: The structure of errors in the serial order of speech. Neuropsych- 
ologia, 8, 323-350. (Reprinted in Fromkin, V.A. (Ed.) (1973). Speech errors as linguistic 
evidence. The Hague: Mouton.)
MacKay, D. (1987). The organization of perception and action: A theory for language and other 
cognitive skills. New York: Springer.
Maclay, H., & Osgood, C.E. (1959). Hesitation phenomena in spontaneous English speech. Word, 15, 
19-44.
Martin, N., Weisberg, R.W., & Saffran, E .M . (1989). Variables influencing the occurrence of naming 
errors: Implications for a model of lexical retrieval. Journal of Memory and Language, 28,
462-485.
W.J.M . Leveli
Meringer. R., & Mayer, K. (1895). Versprechen und Verlesen. Stuttgart: Goschensche Verlag. 
(Re-issued, with introductory essay by A. Cutler and D .A . Fay (1978). Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins.)
Meyer, A.S. (1990). The time course of phonological encoding in language production: The encoding 
of successive syllables of a word. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 524-545.
Meyer. A.S. (1991). The time course of phonological encoding in language production: Phonological 
encoding inside a syllable. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 69-89.
Meyer, A .S., & Schriefers, H. (1991). Phonological facilitation in picture-word interference experi­
ments: Effects of stimulus onset asynchrony and types of interfering stimuli. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17.
Miller, G .A . ,  & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1976). Language and perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Morton, J. (1969). The interaction of information in word recognition. Psychological Review, 76,
165-178.
Nespor, M ., & Vogel, I. (1986). Prosodic phonology. Dordrecht: Foris.
Nooteboom, S. (1967). Some regularities in phonemic speech errors. Annual Progress Report. Institute 
for Perception Research IPO , 2, 65-70.
Oldfield. R.C. (1963). Individual vocabulary and semantic currency: A preliminary study. British 
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 2, 122-130.
Oldfield, R .C ., & Wingfield, A. (1965). Response latencies in naming objects. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 17, 273-281.
Rosch, E., Mervis, C .B ., Gray, W., Johnson, D., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural 
categories. Cognitive Psychology, S. 382—139.
Schenkein, J. (1980). A  taxonomy for repeating action sequences in natural conversation. In B. 
Butterworth (Ed.), Language production: Vol. I. Speech and talk (pp. 21—17). London: 
Academic Press.
Schlesinger. I.M. (1990). The wax and wane of Whorfian views. Working paper #32. The Goldie 
Rotman Center for Cognitive Science in Education. Jerusalem: Hebrew University.
C  J
Schriefers, H., Meyer, A.S.. & Levelt, W .J.M . (1990). Exploring the time course of lexical access in 
production: Picture-word interference studies. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 86-102.
Selkirk. E. (1984). Phonology and syntax: The relation between sound and structure. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Seymour, P .H .k. (1979). Human visual cognition. New York: St Martin’s Press.
Shattuck-Hulnagel. S. (1979). Speech errors as evidence for a serial order mechanism in sentence 
production. In W.E. Cooper & E.C.T. Walker (Eds.). Sentence processing: Psycholinguistic 
studies presented to Merrill Garrett (pp. 295-342). Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum.
Shattuck-Hufnagel, S. (1987). The role of word onset consonants in speech production planning: New 
evidence from speech error patterns. In E. Keller & M. Gopnik (Eds.), Motor and sensory 
processing in language (pp. 17-51). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stemberger. J.P. (1983). Speech errors and theoretical phonology: A review. Bloomington: Indiana 
Linguistics Club.
Stemberger, J.P. (1985). An interactive action model of language production. In A.W. Ellis (Ed.), 
Progress in the psychology of language (Vol. 1, pp. 143-186). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Ward, N. (1988). Issues in word choice. Budapest: COLING-88.
Ward, N. (1991). A flexible, parallel model of natural language generation. Report No. U CB/CSD  
91/629. Computer Science Division (EECS), UC Berkeley.
